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POLIOE SOIENCE NOTESScientific Determination of Alco- a sample of urine will not render
holic Intoxication-T h e Supreme the doctor's analysis inadmissible."
Court of Arizona in the recent deAccording to the doctor's testicision of State v. Duguid, 72 Pac. mony the analysis of the defen(2d) 435 (Ariz., 1937), had occadant's urine indicated the presence
sion to pass upon the admissibility of "two milligrams of ethyl alcoof the results of a urine analysis hol per cubic centimeter of urine."
made for the purpose of determin- The doctor explained how this
ing whether the defendant was much alcohol would affect a perunder the influence of intoxicating son:
"There are four ordinary
liquor while driving upon the pubstandards which we use to deterlic highways of Arizona, as was mine drunkenness, depending upon
charged by the State in its prosethe amount of alcohol which we
cution for the offense,
recover in the urine or blood. This
After the defendant's arrest he ranges from one to four or five
was taken to a clinical laboratory milligrams per cubic centimeter.
where a physician made a chemOne milligram, a patient may be
ical analysis for ethyl alcohol in drunk, but decently so. Two milthe defendant's urine, a specimen ligrams, distinctly drunk. Three
of which he furnished the doctor. milligrams, usually drunk and disUpon the trial the physician testiorderly. And four milligrams or
fled as to the results of the analysis. more, dead drunk."
The defendant objected, and conIn connection with this decision
tended that the admission of this the reader is referred to the folevidence compelled him to give lowing article which appeared in a
evidence against himself in viola- previous issue of this Journal, and
tion of his constitutional privilege particularly to that section of the
against self-incrimination.
The article dealing with the admissibilevidence introduced at the trial inity in evidence of the results of
dicated that the urine specimen tests for alcoholic intoxication:
was given upon request. Upon Inbau, F. E., "Self-Incriminationappeal the Supreme Court of Ari- What Can an Accused Person Be
zona ruled adversely to the deCompelled to Do?", 28 J. Criminal
fendant's contention. The opinion L. and Crim. 261-93 at pp. 288-293
of the appellate court stated: "This
(1937).
evidence shows respondent acted
under no compulsion but freely
and voluntarily.

Under such cir-

cumstances there can be no doubt
of the admissibility of the doctor's
findings. The fact that the respondent may not have known why
he was asked to give (the doctor)

Photography -

Admissibility

of

Sound Movie of Accused Person Making a Criminal Confession-Dur in g
the course of the trial of People v.
Hayes, 71 Pac. (2d) 321 (Cal. App.,
1937), involving a prosecuting for
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manslaughter, the court permitted
a sound motion picture of the defendant making a confession to be
received as competent evidence.
In objecting to the admissibility
of this evidence the defendant contended that it constituted a violation of his right to be confronted
by witnesses against him; of the
right to cross-examine the witnesses who testified against him; of
the privileges and immunities secured to him by the constitution
of the state of California; and further, that the sound movie constituted "unsworn testimony, hearsay evidence, compelled him to be
a witness against himself, and
deprived him of due process of
law."
In approving of the trial court's
ruling in admitting this evidence
the appellate court said: "If after
a preliminary examination, the
trial judge is satisfied that a sound
moving picture reproduces accurately that which has been said and
done, and the other requirements
relative to the admissibility of a
confession are present i. e., it was
freely and voluntarily made without hope of immunity or promise
of reward, then, not only should
the preliminary foundation and the
sound moving picture go to the
jury, but in keeping with the policy
of the courts to avail themselves
of each and every aid of science
for the purpose of ascertaining the
truth, such practice is to be commended as of inestimable value to
triers of fact in reaching accurate
conclusions.
"This particular case well illustrates the advantage to be gained
by courts utilizing modern methods
of science in ascertaining facts.
The objection is frequently heard
in criminal trials that a defendant's

confession has not been freely and
voluntarily made, he testifying that
it was induced either by threats or
force or under the hope or promise
of immunity or reward, which is
denied by witnesses on behalf of
the People. When a confession is
presented by means of a movietone
the trial court is enabled to determine more accurately the truth c"
falsity of such claims and rule
accordingly."
Admissibility

of

Wire

Tapping

Evidence-The Supreme Court of
the United States on Dec. 30, 1937,
in the case of Nardone v. U. S., 58
Sup. Ct. 275, 82 L. Ed. 258, reversed
a decision of the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals and held, contrary to the Circuit Court's ruling,
that the evidence obtained by federal officers in this case involving
a tapping of telephone wires carrying interstate messages was inadmissible. (The decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals was noted
in the last issue of this Journal.)
The Supreme Court held (with
two justices dissenting) that in
view of the provisions of the Communications Act of June 19, 1934,
no evidence procurred by a federal officer in tapping interstate
telephone wires could be used in a
criminal prosecution. Section 605
of the Communications Act provides that no person who, as an
employee, has anything to do with
the sending of any interstate communication by wire shall divulge
or publish it or its substance to
anyone other than the addressee or
his authorized representative, or to
authorized fellow employees, save
in response to a subpoena issued
by a court of competent jurisdiction, or on demand of other lawful
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authority; and that no person not
being authorized by the sender
shall intercept any communication
and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect or meaning of such intercepted communication to any
person. In interpreting this provision Justice Roberts stated in the
Supreme Court's opinion: "Taken
at face value the phrase 'no person' comprehends federal agents,
and the ban on communications to
'any person' bars testimony to the
contents of an intercepted mes-

sage." The government had contended that Congress did not intend to prohibit authorized federal
agents from tapping telephone
wires to procure evidence. But the
Court said: "We nevertheless face
the fact that the plain words of
-Section 605 forbid anyone, unless
authorized by the sender, to intercept a telephone message, and
direct in equally clear language
that 'no person' shall divulge or
publish the message or its substance to 'any person'."

